There is no dispute that one of the most innovative and relevant aspects of the reforms of June 10, 2011 to the Mexican Federal Constitution, specifically to Article 1 and to the expansion of the amparo, or protection, concept through a new Amparo Law, has been the formal adoption of the principle known as pro homine or pro personae by all judges nationwide.
This principle of pro homine or pro personae leaves the conventional interpretive theories of law behind and focuses instead on a simple rule: what precisely is the preferred application of the most favourable law that will benefit all individuals, regardless of their origin, their generality or specialty, or their national or international status.
As a result, the exclusive right of federal national judges to apply and interpret the law, previously given to them by the concentrated control written into the constitution, has given way to a more diffuse control that allows any judge to apply, analyse and interpret the law. Indeed, it is evident that a willingness to apply the law most favourable to individuals has actually materialised.
However, applying the law most favourable to individuals places a large responsibility on national judges, as those who tend to apply the law rather than interpret it are in danger, in this exercise of statutory interpretation, of making groundless and illegal decisions.
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Amparo Law; Mexican Supreme Court;